Research
Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Perceptual Qualities in Plato’s Theaetetus (182d1–7) (Revise and resubmit)
Abstract
Plato’s refutation of radical flux (RF) in the Theaetetus (179d–183b) aims to show that this theory destroys language and knowledge. Its first move, however, is little understood: already at 182d1–7, correct speech about perceptual qualities is declared to fail, and existing readings fail to explain why this happens. I argue that the failure is grounded in the metaphysical indeterminacy of perceptual qualities. At the argument’s dialectical starting-point, qualities are assumed to be perceptible yet shown never to settle into determinate states: in RF, a color is never determinately white rather than some other color. As a result, statements like ‘this is white’ cannot latch onto anything in the world that would make them correct. Socrates’ strategy is to grant the fluxist a vocabulary of qualitative change (‘a change into another color,’ 182d3) and to show that their theory undermines the very determinacy that vocabulary presupposes. This reading prepares the refutation’s conclusion: RF undermines ontological determinacy and so is left with an idiom ‘spoken indeterminately’ (apeiron legomenon, 183b5).
The Argument for Forms in Plato’s Timaeus (51d–52a) (Manuscript)
Abstract
In Timaeus 51b6–52a4, Plato asks whether Forms exist and answers in the affirmative, on the grounds that intellect (nous) and true belief (alēthēs doxa) are two distinct kinds of cognition. While this has been called Plato’s only argument for Forms, its structure and premises remain underexamined. In particular, it is unclear what licenses the inference from cognitive kinds to Forms, and how the differences Timaeus adduces establish that intellect and true belief are two cognitive kinds. I argue that the passage compresses a valid argument, whose conditional first premise rests on a commitment about cognition and its objects that the cosmology of the Timaeus relies on more generally, and whose second premise defends the distinction between intellect and true belief without begging the question by assuming Forms.
Futter’s Socrates and the Nocturnal Council (Invited critical notice)
Philosophical Papers · Abstract
In the final book of Plato’s Laws, the Athenian Stranger requires the Nocturnal Council’s members to know what virtue is and how its four parts are one and many, a requirement he formulates in strikingly Socratic terms. No one in the dialogue, the Athenian included, claims to possess such knowledge. I ask whether Dylan Futter’s account of Socrates’ search for wisdom can illuminate how the Council’s first members are to acquire this knowledge, and argue that his exegetical model does indeed explain how learning is possible without a present knower. However, the model sets a ceiling on human wisdom and leaves open how the virtues differ from one another despite being unified qua knowledge. On neither Futter’s reading nor the other interpretations I consider does Socratic inquiry by itself yield the definitions the Council needs, and I suggest that this raises important questions concerning the place of Socrates’ thought in Plato’s political philosophy.
Armonia, concordia e politica in Eraclito e nei pitagorici (2021)
Eirene 57(I–II): 93–118 · Abstract
This paper examines the relation between Pythagorean and Heraclitean political views. I argue that for Pythagoras, Heraclitus, and Archytas the cosmological and musical notions of harmony (ἁρμονία) and the related notion of concord (ὁμόνοια) have an intrinsic political significance. These thinkers variously reflect upon political harmony and concord, and agree that a crucial condition for it is law (νόμος), which according to Pythagoras and Heraclitus has a divine origin. I begin with the Heraclitean fragments 22 B51, 54, 72, and 114 DK, in which social and political reflection is connected with the theory of the harmony of opposites. In the case of Pythagoras and early Pythagoreanism, the intense, albeit indirect political influence in Magna Graecia – as transmitted by Iamblichus and Porphyry – offers evidence for social and political ideas determined by a reflection on the cosmological role of harmony and number. Finally, Archytas’ political application of rational calculation in fragment 47 B3 DK, which aims at producing concord by establishing the just measures of wealth in the city, together with the testimony on Archytas’ intense and fruitful political activity, can be taken as confirmation that the thinker’s wider cosmological views were indeed intertwined with his political reflection and action.
Education, Conflict, and Harmony in Book 1 of Plato’s Laws (2021)
Journal of Ancient Philosophy 15(2): 29–52 · Abstract
Book 1 of Plato’s Laws, and particularly the image of the puppet introduced near its end, has been traditionally interpreted as presenting the moral psychology model that underlies the educational system delineated by the Athenian Stranger, which construes virtue as consonance between the non–rational and the rational elements of the soul. But a different and competing conception of virtue looms large in Laws 1, virtue as victory of the best part of the soul in psychic conflict. This paper argues that the Athenian’s conception of education as the correct conformation of originally conflicting psychic forces requires the simultaneous presence of the harmony and the conflict models of virtue in Laws 1. Education is in turn defined by calculation, the rational activity which persuasively leads the conflicting non–rational forces towards a consonant reciprocal rapport. By strategically developing his understanding of education and calculation in Laws 1, the Athenian shows how the harmony model of virtue overcomes the conflict model, while at the same time recognising that there is some truth to the conflict model after all and integrating it within the harmony model.
La asombrosa marioneta del Extranjero Ateniense: de la imagen a la filosofía en las Leyes de Platón (2019)
Universitas Philosophica 36(73): 121–146 · Abstract
Este ensayo sostiene que la estructura general de las Leyes de Platón obedece al principio de acceso indirecto al conocimiento del alma humana, que consiste en la comprensión de que la aproximación filosófica al alma solo es posible inicialmente a través de una imagen de ella. El decurso de las Leyes puede interpretarse como un movimiento hacia la interioridad del alma a partir de la famosa imagen de la marioneta, de acuerdo con la cual se comienza por analizar los elementos no-racionales del alma, capaces de conformarse en armonía con el elemento racional, y se avanza poco a poco hacia el elemento racional o epistémico. Solo al final del diálogo, con la fundación del Consejo Divino, aparece la necesidad política de emprender la investigación dialéctica para alcanzar un conocimiento filosófico del alma humana y de su excelencia específica. De este modo, el diálogo dramatiza el progresivo nacimiento de la filosofía, entendida como investigación dialéctica de la unidad de la virtud, a partir de la comprensión inicial del alma humana contenida en el mito de la marioneta.